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Abstract 
 
Advanced cybercommunities are communities in which perfect surveillance is possible – software tools allow everything 
to be observed, recorded, archived, pored over at a later date and acted upon. Hence, one expects that these surveillance 
technologies ought to be heavily used and effective in controlling deviance in these cybercommunities. Drawing on our 
research in the cybercommunity Second Life, we observe that surveillance technologies are not heavily used to deal with 
deviance; instead, it is the power of relationships that form the fabric of social control and the regulation of deviance. This 
discovery questions the effectiveness of technology as a regulator, both in Second Life and in the real world, as well as 
evidences the importance of social bond as a mediator of deviance.  
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Introduction 
 
It seems that building a surveillance society is the means to achieve a secure society (Lyon 2007). The 
building of a surveillance society has generated a new security architecture – increasingly, surveillance 
technologies and techniques are built into our physical and virtual surroundings, and surveillance practices 
are increasingly becoming an inseparable part of our everyday life (Jones 2005; Lyon 2007; Zedner 2009). 
In particular, the significant growth in surveillance technologies in policing and related functions seems to 
be sending a general message – surveillance is good for society and technology is the source of our 
security.  
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The growth in surveillance technologies in both number and application is taking place in the face of a 
continuous debate over the lack of effectiveness, high financial cost and negative social consequences of 
these technologies (e.g. Lyon 1994; Norris and Armstrong 1999; Armitage 2002; McCahill 2002; Welsh 
and Farrington 2008; Coleman and McCahill 2011). Yet, the fallibility and failure of surveillance 
technologies lead not to their abandonment, but to an approach that attributes the lack of effectiveness to 
insufficient numbers, applications and coverage of these technologies. For example, over a decade ago, in 
their observational study of the open-street CCTV surveillance cameras, Norris and Armstrong (1999) 
showed how the operation of these systems “rather than contributing to social justice through the 
reduction of victimisation ... may become a tool of injustice through the amplification of differential and 
discriminatory policing” (ibid: 201). This discovery and others (e.g. Goodwin 2002; Griffiths 2003; Gill 
and Spriggs 2005; Gill et al. 2006; Farrington et al. 2007; Woodhouse 2010) have led to a counterfactual 
proliferation of ‘automated socio-technical systems’, such as further applications of CCTV surveillance 
systems (e.g. CCTV speed cameras that target ‘respectable citizens’ (Finn and McCahill 2010)), to watch 
“more people from more walks of life” (Haggerty and Ericson 2006: 5) and to eventually lead to a ‘non-
discriminatory’ rationale for monitoring by targeting the entire population (Lianos and Douglas 2000). 
Despite the empirical evidence, it seems that the faith in surveillance technologies as effective 
mechanisms of promoting and achieving a secure society is unshakeable. Following this belief, 
surveillance technologies should work at their best in an environment where these technologies are 
ubiquitous, i.e. where there is complete technological surveillance or perfect surveillance, such as one 
finds in certain cybercommunities.  
 
The cybercommunity Second Life is an environment where perfect surveillance is endemic to the 
environment. Second Life was created to replicate, reflect, extend and expand the real world, and therefore 
contains features common to many contemporary societies, cultures and all kinds of advanced human 
activities. Thus, sociologically, Second Life is an authentic social community with a rich communal life, 
including deviance. Technologically, however, it is a piece of computer software – its functions and 
limitations are determined by the programmers who design and build the system architecture. Thus, it is 
perfectly possible for the programmers to build automated systems which carry out actions that prevent, 
confront or punish deviant behaviour at any time, with no need for human input and no room for subjects 
to negotiate with the surveillance regime. Actually, Second Life is a place where ‘dataveillance’ (van der 
Ploeg 2003: 71) is endemic – every word typed by the residents and every movement made by their virtual 
bodies can be observed, recorded, stored in digital files and pored over in real time or later over long time 
intervals. In this way, Second Life is a true automated socio-technical environment – an extreme exemplar 
of many automated socio-technical environments constructed by tracking devices, machine-based access 
control, automated CCTV, and so on, in the real world (cf. Lianos and Douglas 2000). In the 
cybercommunity, it is possible to use “No other logic than whatever is programmed into [its] software 
whereby access is accepted or denied; identity is either confirmed or rejected; behaviour is either 
legitimate or illegitimate” (Norris 2003: 276). Indeed, Second Life can create and sustain a totalitarian 
cyber state that is equal to anything found in science fiction – even in the work of the bleakest imagination 
building on George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1948).  
 
In short, Second Life is home to thousands of communities in which perfect surveillance is practically 
possible and easily achievable. In this context, therefore, one might reasonably expect that surveillance 
technology be heavily used to regulate deviance in the cybercommunity. Moreover, if surveillance 
technology works as an effective regulator, then it should work at its best in Second Life, where the 
environment is constructed by technologies, where technology is native to its social life – all activities, 
including the deviant ones, are carried out in full three dimensional (3D) detail, through technological 
tools, where ‘absolute security is no longer a chimera’ (Zedner 2003: 158).  
 
In this article, we draw on our research on deviance that was carried out in the cybercommunity Second 
Life. Our empirical research consisted of participant observation, survey research and discussion in a 
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Second Life residential forum (Wang 2009). Following participant observation, a standard list of 91 acts 
covering different types of potentially deviant acts and a list of 39 motivations for becoming residents of 
Second Life were constructed and translated into three different questionnaires (Wang 2009). These 
questionnaires were sent to three different samples of participants in Second Life to assess individual 
participants’ perception, experience and performance of deviance in the cybercommunity. In the first 
questionnaire, the participants were asked to provide information about their perception of each of the 91 
deviant acts1 and to rate the extent of their motivation for participation in Second Life by each of the 39 
motivations.2 In the second and third questionnaire, the participants were asked to provide information 
about the number of times that they had experienced or performed each of the 91 potentially deviant acts, 
during their last ten substantial3 visits in Second Life.4 A thematic list of 16 questions focusing on the key 
themes that had emerged from the survey research was formulated based on the data derived from the 
questionnaires (Wang 2009). These questions were posted on a Second Life residential forum named 
Resident Answers over a period of 96 hours, with the purpose of initiating and stimulating discussion and 
debate about the nature and regulation of deviance among participants in Second Life – generating rich 
qualitative data.  
 
Our findings suggest that deviance is not the dominant culture of Second Life. Instead the normal 
disciplines by which individuals act and evaluate acts in the real world are strongly evident in the 
cybercommunity. This finding is in contrast to the existing academic view which suggests that some 
fundamental characteristics of cybercommunities are responsible for high levels of deviance (e.g. Presdee 
2000; Williams 2003, 2006, 2007; Wall 2007), as well as the media portrayal of the ‘dark side’ of Second 
Life encouraging the idea that cybercommunities are ‘hotbeds of deviance’ (Holahan 2006).  
 
This does not mean that there is no notion of deviant behaviour or an absence of deviance in Second Life. 
Our findings show that acts that are considered as highly deviant are technology-related and may only be 
carried out by individuals with advanced technical skill (e.g. “using programs to take over another avatar” 
and “using programs to vandalise community property”). After these, there are acts that are child-related 
(e.g. “exchanging child related pornographic material” and “an adult using Teen Second Life to make 
contact with young adults for sexual purposes”). Then, there are acts that damage and disrupt Second Life 
as a community (e.g. “actions that are designed to slow down Second Life server performance” and 
“actions that diminish the Second Life community as a whole”). These are followed by a wide range of 
acts that contravene the Big Six5 and other established institutional and local norms in Second Life, as well 
as many text and graphic related acts (e.g. “revealing the real life identity of another avatar” and “sending 
harassing Instant Message (IM) to another avatar”). Lastly, there are acts that can be considered as more 
extreme expressions of many liberal ideas that already exist in the real world (e.g. “a married individual 
marrying another avatar in Second Life” and “using a threatening or aggressive looking avatar”). Overall, 
however, one of the more surprising and relevant findings of our research is the relatively low level of 
deviance and victimisation reported by participants in Second Life. Our data shows that more than 70%, 
and more than 85%, of our questionnaire respondents reported that they had never experienced, or 
performed, any of the acts on the standard list, respectively.  
 
                                                      
1 They were to select one of the five response categories: 1 = Not at all deviant; 2 = Slightly deviant; 3 = Certainly deviant; 4 = 
Very deviant; and 5 = Don’t know. 
2 They were to select one of the five response categories: 1 = Not at all motivated; 2 = Not very much motivated; 3 = A bit 
motivated; 4 = Quite a lot motivated; and 5 = Very much motivated. 
3 Each of those visits lasting longer than an hour. 
4 They were to select one of the five response categories: 1 = 0 times; 2 = 1-5 times; 3 = 6-10 times; 4 = 11- 15 times; and 5 = 
more than 15 times. 
5 On an institutional level, Linden Lab sets out six kinds of major ‘crime’ in Second Life, which include ‘intolerance’, 
‘harassment’, ‘assault’, ‘disclosure’, ‘adult regions, groups, and listings’ and ‘disturbing the peace’ (see: 
http://secondlife.com/corporate/cs.php; accessed 04/08/2011). 
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More importantly, the apparently low frequency of deviance in Second Life was not attributed to any 
formal surveillance carried out by Linden Lab using technological tools. Our participants, it seems, were 
either unaware or unconcerned by the extreme possibilities for surveillance. Actually, our data suggests 
that the ‘state’ – the creator of the Second Life software, Linden Lab – appears very reluctant to use the 
technological tools at its disposal to regulate deviance. This reluctance is conspicuously antithetical to the 
technological capability of Second Life. Moreover, the panoply and power of technological surveillance 
and regulation that are available to Linden Lab are not fully accessible to proxies in the cybercommunity. 
Proxies – what one may think of as organic local governments – have limited power to use technological 
tools to punish, but they can monitor and record online behaviour. Thus, because of the technological 
nature of the environment, proxies are able to exercise technological regulation.  
 
Consequently, a question arises: Why do individuals obey the rules and norms in Second Life? Drawing on 
empirical data, our analyses of personal and social bonds between individuals and the Second Life 
community, and between individuals in communities in Second Life reveal that it is the power of 
relationships that form the fabric of social control and the regulator of deviance. Thus, our data sheds a 
new light on the heavy adoption of surveillance technology in policing and related functions. Drawing on 
the data, we challenge the very idea of using technology as a regulator, and the effectiveness of 
technology as a regulator, in controlling and regulating deviance, both in Second Life and in the real 
world.  
 
On Second Life and Deviance in the Cybercommunity 
 
Our empirical field of enquiry – the cybercommunity Second Life – is a 3D Internet-based 
cybercommunity developed by Linden Lab. It was first launched to the public on June 23, 2003. Anyone 
can become a resident of Second Life by downloading a client program named Second Life Viewer and 
interacting with other residents via self-created 3D avatars (Carr and Pond 2007). Actually, user-created 
content is the fundamental feature of Second Life. At its inception, the chairman of Linden Lab, Philipp 
Rosedale, wanted to design a virtual world where there is no barrier between thought and action (Guest 
2007). With that vision in mind, Linden Lab only developed the virtual physics, designed the interface, 
invented the basic rules covering ownership and hoped that a society would emerge (Rymaszewski et al. 
2007). A society has, indeed, emerged – practically it is built by its residents using a programming 
language named Linden Scripting Language (LSL) (Boellstorff 2008). Second Life has grown into the 
most popular international cybercommunity, which consists of thousands of user-defined sub-communities 
and groups with an extensive range of themes and purposes, such as business, entertainment, education, 
leisure, etc. (Carr and Pond 2007).  
 
In particular, the real-world tradability of Linden Dollars (L$) (the currency in Second Life) has made real 
estate the most lucrative activity in Second Life, and has – in the most tangible way – connected the 
cybercommunity and the real world. For example, in November 2006, Anshe Chung declared herself 
Second Life’s first millionaire in US dollars.6 In 2007, Linden Lab estimated that Chung made 
US$150,000 per year from buying and selling virtual lands in Second Life (Rymaszewski et al. 2007). 
Besides business entrepreneurs, other groups of individuals, such as writers, musicians, politicians and 
academics, have joined Second Life, to reach a new audience, to experiment with a synthetic universe, or 
to have a taste of an innovative way of communication. For example, the realm of academia is represented 
by the cyberspace law expert – Lawrence Lessig; the man who first introduced and defined the term 
‘virtual community’ – Howard Rheingold; and the man whose novel Snow Crash (1992) inspired the 
creation of Second Life – Neal Stephenson. 
 
                                                      
6 See: http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_18/b3982002.htm (accessed 06/08/2011).  
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Certainly, for Second Life to exist as a social community, it must be populated by users who participate 
actively (cf. Sangwan et al. 2009). Between 2005 and 2007, Second Life was undoubtedly the most 
popular cybercommunity – it was on the cover of magazines, extensively reported on the well-known 
Cable News Network (CNN) and frequently featured on TV shows and documentaries (Scoble 2010). 
Despite recent questions as to why Second Life has past its prime,7 there is strong counter evidence for the 
continuing popularity and rise of Second Life (e.g. Takahashi 2010). Seven years after its launch to the 
public, in March 2010, Linden Lab reported that Second Life had more than 1 million active residents8 
and virtual participation of more than 1,400 corporations, universities and government agencies (Vollmer 
2010). On August 5, 2011, 21,141,990 user accounts were recorded in Second Life (Childs 2011). Philip 
Rosedale once told a Second Life blogger that about only 10% of newly created residents are still signing 
in weekly, three months later.9 Based on this percentage, on August 5, 2011, there were more than two 
million active residents in Second Life. Moreover, Second Life continues to be a community with a 
functioning and successful economy. Large businesses, such as Air France, Cisco Systems, Dell, IBM and 
Siemens, are still actively operating in Second Life (Cremorne 2011). In 2009, as the real world economy 
shrivelled, the Second Life’ economy continued to flourish – user-to-user transactions reached US$567 
million, a 65% jump over 2008 (Rosenwald 2010). In March 2010 – a time when many other 
cybercommunities were closing (e.g. Vivaty and There.com) – Second Life had a record month as user-to-
user transactions reached US$57 million; transactions for the first quarter of 2010 reached US$160 
million, a 30% year-over-year jump (Caoili 2010). In December 2010 alone, about 770,000 unique 
residents made repeat visits to Second Life and these residents converted US$55 million of their Second 
Life income in 2010, transferring it to their PayPal accounts (Rosenwald 2010). These figures show that 
the Second Life social world is still very much alive.  
 
Second Life is, however, also a fantasy world that offers its participants a set of capabilities superior to the 
physical world – it is a world where the boundary between reality and imagination is truly indistinct; 
where, through 3D avatars and ‘stage-managing’ these avatars, individuals can truly be whoever and 
whatever they want to be, and do almost whatever they want to do – possess fantasy physical 
characteristics, lead idealised lifestyles, fly without wings. The sociability and real world tradability of life 
in Second Life coupled with its fantasy elements lead to questions such as “If Second Life isn’t a game, 
what is it?” (Kalning 2007). Actually, the question as to whether Second Life should be perceived as an 
online game is fundamental to research on deviance in the environment and to the intellectual depth of this 
article. 
 
Thus, it needs to be emphasised that Second Life differs significantly from many offline computer games 
and online virtual reality games – it is a cybercommunity. For Curtis (1992), “[a cybercommunity] is not 
goal-oriented; it has no beginning or end, no ‘score’, and no notion of ‘winning’ or ‘success’… [such an 
online environment] isn’t really a game at all” (ibid: 122). Certainly, Second Life is not a game 
programmed by game creators and played by game players. Treating such an environment as a game 
would confuse online sociality with competition and entertainment, therefore, dismissing forms of 
intimacy, community and political economy in Second Life (Boellstorff 2008). Moreover, Second Life is 
also very different from popular online social software, such as Facebook and Twitter, which are social 
networking sites – designed for real world people to maintain real world contact. Thus, Second Life is 
different; it is a genuine social community, one where people can live out an authentic and ‘full’ 
alternative virtual ‘physical’ existence (Boellstorff 2008).  
                                                      
7 This is evident in news articles, such as “What happens to Second Life?” (Hanson 2009) and “How to save Second Life in 
Seven Easy Steps” (Wjamesau 2010), as well as personal blogs, such as “Why I hardly ever go on Second Life anymore” 
(Wagner 2011). 
8 Individuals who log in Second Life to activate their avatars regularly. 
9 See: http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2006/11/new world numbe.html (accessed 10/03/08). 
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This conception makes Second Life an authentic and fertile ground for criminological research. In contrast 
to the volume of literature about deviance in the physical world, there is, at this moment, a limited 
understanding of deviance in cybercommunities, especially from first-hand empirical research (e.g. 
Williams 2003). Moreover, existing research on deviance in cybercommunities tends to situate the field of 
enquiry in the wider and more advanced field of cybercrime, and tends to focus on the idea that some 
fundamental characteristics of the Internet in general, and cybercommunities in particular, are responsible 
for high levels of deviance or crime (e.g. Williams 2006; Yar 2006; Wall 2007). To distinguish deviance 
from crime, Williams (2003) suggests that in contrast to cybercrime in which networked computers are 
used to perpetrate criminal acts, deviance in cybercommunities can be defined as activities that contravene 
social norms and values – and such cybercommunities are commonly perceived as fertile grounds for 
deviance to manifest. The environment of cybercommunities may be characterised as an ‘unregulated 
bandit country’, where deviance flourishes as a result of “The relative freedom individuals may feel by 
being untied from material commitments of the offline world” (Williams 2003: 185). Indeed, whether 
evidence-based or not, the public link between cybercommunities and deviance is strong (Wall 2011). In 
particular, the ‘dark side’ of Second Life has attracted much attention from the media, promoting the idea 
that cybercommunities are deviance-ridden (e.g. Holahan 2006; O’Hear 2006; Black 2007; Lynn 2007; 
Stanage 2007; Reuters 2008a; Rivington 2008; Warrant and Palmer 2011). 
 
Certainly, Second Life has its darker side – different forms of deviant acts do occur in the 
cybercommunity. These include general deviant acts in cyberspace, such as cyber harassment, cyber 
trespass, cyber theft, cyber obscenity and cyber violence; and specific acts that have been identified by 
Williams’ (2003) empirical research in the cybercommunity Activeworlds, such as profanity, flooding10 
and vandalism. However, since Second Life is known for its sociability, instead of using terminologies of 
a legalistic manner, deviant acts in the cybercommunity are described in Second Life Community 
Standards11 in a language that is easily understood by its residents and outsiders. Specific deviant acts 
include those that have been prohibited by the Big Six governing principles of behaviour in Second Life. 
Next, we deal with each of these in turn.  
 
Intolerance concerns behaviours that belittle or diminish individuals, groups in Second Life, or the Second 
Life community as a whole, e.g. the use of derogatory language or images against another resident’s 
religion, gender, race, ethnicity or sexual orientation. Harassment includes activities that are carried out in 
a manner which is offensively coarse, intimidating or threatening, e.g. unwelcome sexual advances. 
Assault pertains to shooting, pushing, or shoving another resident in areas where these acts are strictly 
prohibited by Second Life, as well as creating or using scripted objects to target another resident in a 
manner that would prevent the targeted resident from enjoying their Second Life experience. Disclosure 
mainly deals with the revelation of another resident’s real world personal details that are not volunteered 
in his resident profile, including gender, religion, age, marital status, race, sexual preference and alternate 
account names. Disclosure also refers to the violation of another residents’ privacy in Second Life, which 
includes remotely monitoring conversations, posting conversation logs, or sharing conversation logs 
without consent. Adult regions, groups, and listings concerns ‘adult’ content, activity and communication, 
especially those of a sexual nature. Although Second Life is an adult community, it is separated into 
different regions, such as ‘adult’, ‘moderate’ and ‘general’ – any ‘adult’ content that falls under Second 
Life’s Adult Maturity Definition12 is only allowed in ‘adult’ regions. Disturbing the peace refers to the 
disruption of scheduled events, the repeated transmission of unwanted advertising material, the use of 
                                                      
10  Flooding is exemplified by the act of uploading excess amount of advertising materials to slow down server performance.  
11 See: http://secondlife.com/corporate/cs.php (accessed 08/08/2011). 
12 See: http://community.secondlife.com/t5/English-Knowledge-Base/Maturity-ratings/ta-p/700119#Adult  
(accessed 06/08/2011).  
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repetitive sounds, etc. It is also concerned with any activities that would reduce server performance or 
hinder other residents’ ability to enjoy life in Second Life.  
 
High profile cases of deviance in Second Life include the ‘Wonderland Sandal’, the ‘Abduction Sandal’, 
the ‘Virtual Rape Scandal’13 and the ‘CopyBot Scandal’. Wonderland is a place in Second Life where 
child-like avatars were found to be offering virtual sex to other avatars (Nino 2008). In August 2008, a 
woman was charged in the US State of Delaware with plotting the real-life abduction of a boyfriend she 
met in Second Life.14 In April 2007, two Belgian newspapers reported that the Brussels public prosecutor 
had asked the Federal Computer Crime Unit to enter Second Life to investigate a virtual rape involving a 
Belgian citizen (Duranske 2007). CopyBot is a program that enables the copying of another user’s content 
without permission (Holahan 2006) – a violation of both the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (US 
DMCA) and the Second Life Term of Service.15  
 
Social and Technological Development of Surveillance 
 
The rise of surveillance is attributed to the growing need for security – “the condition of ‘being protected 
from threats’ ” (Zedner 2009: 14). The growing need for security and the growing perception of this need, 
reflect the wider insecurity of the modern world. In the modern world, crime is considered as a “normal 
social commonplace aspect of modern society” (Garland 2001: 128). Given this, it has been argued that 
crime needs to be reconceptualised as “risk to security” and “demands intervention before crimes occur, 
on the grounds that where the risks can be calculated it is more cost effective to prevent loss than to 
punish retrospectively” (Zedner 2009: 71).  
 
The focus on crime intervention and prevention leads to the emphasis on control of behaviours of large 
groups and individuals. This emphasis both necessitates and leads naturally and in a common sense 
manner to the use of advanced technologies to collect and process data. Thus, various technologies are 
adopted to manage risk. Actions and events are addressed by Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) camera 
surveillance, Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) systems and electronic monitoring of 
convicted offenders. Personal identities are managed with Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) cards, 
PIN numbers, biometric recognition systems, iris scans and DNA profiling. These forms of surveillance 
technologies enable the recording, storing and processing of surveillance data in digital forms across time 
and space, thus turning the concept of ‘global surveillance’ into a realistic prospect (cf. Coleman and 
McCahill 2010).  
 
In turn, the adoption of these surveillance technologies further stimulates the rise of surveillance. For 
Coleman and McCahill (2010), “surveillance has a tendency to disperse and become operative in a wide 
range of social settings ... and by its complexity, sprawl and spatial decentralisation it tends to become 
self-sustaining so that surveillance and control leads to more surveillance and control” (ibid: 19). During 
the past two decades, there has been a significant and continuous growth in the use of surveillance 
technologies both in number and applications. The number of CCTV cameras has grown significantly in 
the UK, US and other Western nations (Welsh and Farrington 2008). For example, in the UK, the number 
of surveillance cameras increased from 100 in 1990 to 400 in 1994, to 5,200 in 1997, to 40,000 in 2002 
(Armitage 2002). In 2006, there were up to 4.2 million CCTV cameras in Britain – about one for every 14 
people, which means that the UK had 1% of the world’s population but 20% of its CCTV cameras (BBC 
News 2006). Moreover, CCTV cameras are integrated into different forms of surveillance technologies, 
such ANPR. Recently, there are 10,502 ANPR cameras collecting data for police forces (Mathieson 
                                                      
13 Virtual rape can be understood as forced online sexual activity through text, animation, malicious script, etc. (Dibbell 1993). 
14 See: http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/woman-jailed-after-killing-virtual-husband-972457.html 
(accessed 06/08/2011).  
15 See: http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (accessed 06/08/2011).  
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2010). In terms of electronic monitoring of convicted offenders, the Global Positioning System (GPS) has 
been increasingly adopted to track offenders in the US since 1997 and has been piloted in a number of 
European countries, including Germany, England, Wales, France and the Netherlands (Nellis 2008). By 
2000, England and Wales had the most thorough electronic monitoring scheme in Europe (ibid 2008). In 
data profiling, the emergence of ‘blanket DNA testing’ of an entire community – where everyone in a 
specific community is treated as a ‘suspect’ until the ‘risk profile’ proves otherwise (McCahill and Norris 
2003) – is an example of the potential of surveillance technology to target entire human populations. 
 
Moreover, the heavy monitoring of everyday life includes surveilling activities on the Internet. The 
wiretapping of telephones has been extended through email to Internet clickstream monitoring (Lyon 
2003). In 2009, the UK government planned to give police and security services the power to snoop on 
every single communication made by the public with the data then likely to be stored in an enormous 
national database (Whitehead 2009). In October 2010, the UK government’s “Security Britain in an Age 
of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review” introduced the Interception Modernisation 
Programme (IMP), which would monitor all residents’ email accesses and website visits (not the actual 
contents of the websites) and store these data for a period of one year (HM Government 2010). Actually, 
due to the technological structure of the Internet, surveillance technologies have the potential to be carried 
out far more forcefully and to work far more vigorously online than offline. In the world of the Internet, it 
is possible to replace rules and norms with codes (Lessig 1999) – inscribe social rules and norms into 
algorithmic formulae – and to render deviance impossible because “the norm becomes a technical rule of 
action” – a kind of “neutral parameter independent of decisions and values” (Lianos and Douglas 2000: 
108). The world of the Internet can be created as an environment, where “discretion and moral judgement 
are peripheral in the sense that the former is almost non-existent and the latter has become a technical 
issue” (Coleman and McCahill 2010: 23). For example, in 2009, the Chinese Government decided to 
install the Green Dam Youth Escort web filter on all PCs sold in China, in order to protect children from 
Internet contents, such as pornographic, violent and other “unhealthy” websites (Chen and Wang 2009). 
Actually, in theory, it is perfectly possible to turn the world of the Internet into a digital panopticon, where 
all people from all walks of life are now monitored (cf. Haggerty and Ericson 2006).  
 
Indeed, with the aid of technologies, the surveillance gaze has been expanded to a level unimaginable in 
the physical world. This expansion leads to a power imbalance between the surveilled and the surveillance 
regime – there is hardly any room for the surveilled to negotiate with the surveillance regime. On the one 
hand, the information captured by surveillance technologies, such as CCTV cameras, is systematically 
stored on a computer file or videotape, ready to be lifted out at some future, as yet unspecified time and 
place (McCahill 2002). On the other hand, to the surveilled, there is no way of knowing “how, where and 
when data about us is stored, how our identities are fabricated within the ‘data image’ (Lyon 1994) or the 
‘data-double’ (Haggerty & Ericson 2000)” (Coleman and McCahill 2010: 20).  
 
Surveillance Capability and Practice in Second Life 
 
Existing in the world of the Internet, the cybercommunity Second Life has a complete governance 
structure. Since Second Life is owned by Linden Lab, the Lab has a total control over the 
cybercommunity. All residents in Second Life agree to observe the Community Standards and the Terms 
of Service, especially the Big Six. Transgressors of the Big Six can be warned, suspended or even 
permanently banished from Second Life by Linden Lab, by sending warning emails, suspending user 
accounts or cancelling user accounts. Of course, an individual is able to keep his actual life identity secret 
from other residents in Second Life, since anyone can register for an account anonymously. However, on 
principle, Linden Lab’s registration policy requires accurate personal information to prevent individuals 
from safeguarding their real-life identities – a resident’s Second Life account name is the same as his 
avatar in Second Life. Thus, Second Life residents’ personal information is directly associated with their 
avatar identity. Linden Lab, therefore, have the power to connect online and offline identities in ways that 
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its residents are unaware (Lo 2008). Thus, although it happens rarely, real world sanctions are not out of 
reach for Linden Lab upon contacting real world justice processes (Boellstorff 2008). 
 
Once an individual enters Second Life after registration, there is absolutely no privacy for his avatar in 
Second Life – Linden Lab is watching and recording all the time – and the potential for in-world Second 
Life sanctions is ever present. Every single item in Second Life, such as a typed word, a simple gesture, a 
conversation via Voice over IP (VoIP) or, indeed, every single action is recorded and stored in the 
database of Isilon Systems, Inc.16 On December 13, 2007, the creator of the Second Life software, Philip 
Rosedale said: “People in Second Life have created over 1 billion in-world ‘objects’ occupying total 
storage space of about 100 terabytes”.17 All these ‘objects’ are perfectly archived and can be pored over at 
any time.  
 
Moreover, there is an abundance of new technologies available in Second Life that can be used for 
surveillance purposes. In fact, technological systems that monitor avatar activity and identify risky 
behaviour are built into the architecture of the Second Life software (Lo 2008). For example, all financial 
transactions in Second Life are monitored and reviewed electronically, and Linden Lab staff review some 
of these transactions (ibid). Thus, Linden Lab is able to expand its active monitoring of financial 
transactions to the active monitoring of all activities in Second Life. For another example, Linden Lab 
subjects its residents to targeted advertising by monitoring their conduct in nearby areas. In 2007, the Lab 
allowed AMPP Media – an advertising company – to place digital billboards within Second Life (Burns 
2007). Unlike normal billboards, these ones are able to scan for keywords in public conversations in 
nearby areas and serve advertisements contextually.18 Technologically, these billboards are perfect tools 
for data mining, which seeks rules for the classification of objects (cf. Gandy 2007). Data mining can be 
used to access and rank high or low risk individuals and groups in relation to deviant activities, as well as 
be used in the prediction of future behaviour and pre-empt deviant behaviours in Second Life.  
 
With the availability and power of such advanced surveillance technologies, theoretically, Linden Lab 
could detect all violations of the Big Six and respond to violators according to the established systems of 
sanctions using technological systems, e.g. digital billboards. But, in practice, the Lab chooses not to 
exercise its technological power of detection and punishment. Instead, residents are encouraged to report 
violations of the Community Standards using the Abuse Reporter application, which is located under the 
Help menu in the tool bar. Between June 2007 and September 2009, there were 21,665 recorded and 
published incidents.19 During that time frame, between two and three million individuals participated in 
Second Life, which means between about 0.7% and 2% of the total user base for that period was recorded 
to have violated the Community Standards.20 These figures suggest that Second Life is a much safer 
                                                      
16 Isilon Systems is a global company physically headquartered in Seattle, USA. It designs and sells storage systems and 
software for digital content and other unstructured data, including Instant Messages (IMs), avatar shapes and appearances, 
Linden Scripting Language (LSL) scripts, digitised audio clips, the design of every building, etc. On February 26, 2007, Isilon 
Systems announced: “10 new additions to its growing community of customers who are driving innovation in the emerging 
world of Web 2.0 content and services. Linden Lab (creator of the Second Life 3D virtual world), Current TV, Dailymotion, 
FlipClip, Imeem, Jump TV, Pandora TV, PhotoBox, Revver and Skyrock are the latest companies to select Isilon IQ clustered 
storage as the core technology for access and storage of the ever-expanding user-created digital content assets that are a hallmark 
of the next generation of Internet interactivity” (see: http://www.isilon.com; accessed 02/08/2010). 
17 See: http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/13/philip-rosedale-answers-your-second-life-questions;  
accessed 04/08/2011. The total storage space of 100 terabytes is equal to the total Internet traffic in 1993 (100 terabytes = 
104857600 megabytes) (http://www.disco-tech.org/2007/10/an\exabyte\here\an\exabyte\the.php; accessed 04/08/2011). 
18 To provide advertisements to individual residents based on a collated ‘interest profile’, which includes a resident’ name and 
age, where the resident spends time in Second Life, the style of clothing the resident currently wears, etc. (see: 
http://adverlab.blogspot.com/2007/04/contextual-advertising-in-second-life.html; accessed 04/08/ 2010).  
19 See: http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2009/09/crime-scene.html (accessed 05/07/2010). 
20 See: http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2009/09/crime-scene.html (accessed 04/08/2010). 
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environment than most areas in the real world. For example, in the UK, the area with the lowest reported 
crime rate – Dyfed-Powys, a large rural police region of Wales recorded 48 crimes per 1,000 residents 
between 2008 and 2009 (4.8%) (Walker et al. 2009).  
 
Of course, there are many sub-communities in Second Life. Some of these sub-communities own a huge 
amount of land and set their local rules. For example, the management group of Azure Island asks all 
residents and guests not to harass others, have over aggressive security systems and create computer 
scripts or virtual objects that impact on the servers negatively.21 The management group of Azure Island 
separates its islands into three different zones: residential, commercial and protected. Each of these zones 
has a unique set of rules and building regulations. Residents in Azure Island are asked to respect these 
rules and building regulations. Moreover, a resident in Second Life is able to create his own group. The 
group creator has the right to grant or refuse membership. Nevertheless, owners of these sub-communities 
and groups can only ask residents to obey their rules and regulations, and identify unwanted behaviours 
and rule breakers. They do not have the technological power that Linden Lab has to punish. However, the 
owners have the power to banish wrongdoers from their communities and groups. They are also able to 
record everything that goes on in their communities and groups, and review the recorded data at any time. 
In fact, Second Life’s Terms of Service22 do not prohibit investigative inquiry as long as ‘remote 
conversation monitoring’ and ‘conversation logs’ are not used while carrying out an inquiry. Thus, any 
resident is able to monitor activity in Second Life. Furthermore, according to Boellstorff (2008), for 
certain serious offences, such as attempting to crash the Second Life software or to gain real world life 
information about another avatar, e.g. credit card numbers, Linden Lab staff would seek support from real 
world justice processes. For example, in 2008, Philip Rosedale asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) to investigate denial of service attacks in Second Life (Reuters 2008b). Nevertheless, if the accused 
lives outside the United States, law enforcement could be very difficult (Wall 2001).  
 
Besides these limited options, Linden Lab is the only governing body in Second Life that is able to deal 
with offences by carrying out formal methods of punishment, including warning, suspension and 
cancellation of account – none of these extend beyond Second Life to reach the person physically. 
Moreover, in order not to appear dictatorial – and thus, to act against Second Life’s original design and 
ideology of “a public park with minimum rules” (Guest 2007: 73) – Linden Lab staff hesitate to act 
against residents unless a clear violation of the Terms of Service is documented (Malaby 2006). Hence, 
instead of creating a virtual dictatorship, Linden Lab’s user-content model of community building has 
driven its governmentality towards the implicit (ibid) – as such much of Linden Lab’s governance 
operates at the level of setting norms, rather than managing daily interactions (Boellstorff 2008). 
 
Personal and Social Bond in Second Life 
 
Based on the central question – Why do individuals obey the rules of society? – social bonding theory23 
assumes that deviant acts occur when an individual’s bond to society is subject to atrophy (Hirschi 1969). 
Based on data collected, we suggest that it is because of the importance and value of these personal and 
social bonds that individuals within Second Life choose to obey global and local rules and norms in the 
cybercommunity, and that the power of these social bonds functions to regulate the behaviour of Second 
Life residents in its diverse communities.  
 
This suggestion is in sharp contrast to current understanding of cybercommunities wherein individuals feel 
free to indulge in activities that contravene common social norms and values (Williams 2003). This view 
                                                      
21 See: http://azure.anshex.com (accessed 04/08/2010). 
22 See: http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (accessed 04/08/2011). 
23 Hirschi’s (1969) control theory is referred as social bonding theory in this article to distinguish it from early control theories 
and self-control theory. 
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is attributed to a weak sense of community in the environments (ibid) which is, in turn, associated with the 
freedom to act without restraint due to the proffered anonymity of cybercommunities (e.g. Demetious and 
Silke 2003). Our data demonstrates that the category of community related motivations is the second most 
motivating property behind individuals’ participation in Second Life: more than 65% of the participants 
are ‘very much’ or ‘quite a lot’ motivated by being able to enjoy general social interactions; more than 
60% of the participants are ‘very much’ or ‘quite a lot’ motivated by being able to meet and be friends 
with like-minded people and more than 47% of the participants are ‘very much’ or ‘quite a lot’ motivated 
by being able to belong to a community. 
 
Social bonding theory assumes that if individuals invest time and energy to carry out various forms of 
conventional activities in a society, they would not want to risk losing their investment by engaging in 
activities that breach the rules of that society. Moreover, involved heavily in these conventional activities, 
individuals may be too busy to consider performing deviant activities. Following these, conventional 
activities in Second Life would bring individuals together and form the fabric of social control in the 
cybercommunity. What are conventional activities in Second Life? We suggest that since, in most cases, 
participation in Second Life is purely optional, conventional activities in the cybercommunity should be 
the reasons that most motivate participation in Second Life. In our research (Wang 2009), nine out of the 
top ten motivations24 are related to pursuing a multitude of choices, finding friends, enjoying social 
interactions and pursuing a sense of self; whereas some of the bottom ten motivations may be associated 
with different degrees of triviality and playfulness (see: Table 1).  
 
 
                                                      
24 Except the 10th “I am free to do whatever I want”.  
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Table 1: The top and bottom 10 motivations on the list of the 39 motivations (1 being the most 
motivating). The motivations are ranked based on their mean scores. The percentage in the table is the 
percentage of participants who are ‘very much’ or ‘quite a lot’ motivated by the property. 
Perhaps, it can be argued that one of the top ten motivations: “I am free to do whatever I want” is 
associated with degrees of playfulness and carelessness, which are often linked to deviance (Williams 
2003). Nevertheless, both “I can have no responsibilities” and “I can do lots of things without worrying 
about the consequences” are among the reasons that least motivate participation in Second Life. This may 
suggest that individuals do not consider Second Life as a place where they can be free from 
responsibilities and they are aware of the consequences of their actions in Second Life. The data leads to 
the possibility that the participants who are ‘very much’ (25%) and ‘quite a lot’ (32%) motivated by “I am 
free to do whatever I want” are merely pursuing a set of activities that can be carried out in Second Life, 
but cannot be carried out in the real world. For example, among the numerous possibilities in Second Life 
– expanding far beyond real world possibilities – that our correspondents reported as motivations for 
participating in Second Life, the ability to express an alternative physical identity is a significant one (e.g. 
Furry25). 
 
Nevertheless, Second Life consists of thousands of sub-communities and groups; some are designed to 
carry out activities that may be considered as deviant in the cybercommunity as a whole. However, to 
participants in these sub-communities and groups, these activities are naturally considered to be 
conventional. This was clearly articulated by one of our correspondents in an open forum discussion:  
 
Various communities often specify rules of behaviour for the activities they support. 
These are more detailed for specific people involved. Other communities do the same for 
people visiting ... a social group will ban public nudity or certain activities in their areas, 
for example. One adapts to the norms of the community, or leaves it if one cannot (Forum 
correspondence, March 5, 2009). 
 
In this case, a strong sense of attachment to the sub-communities and groups and individuals in these may 
lead to more individuals engaging in deviant behaviour and more opportunities for the extent of deviance 
to both broaden and deepen, if the norms of these sub-communities and groups are deviant in the Second 
Life community as a whole. However, our data shows that most individuals do not participate in Second 
Life to join some deviant groups. The extract below demonstrates how strongly individuals in Second Life 
feel about the general assumption that everyone in Second Life is here to carry out activities that deviate 
from social rules and norms of the real world: 
 
Anyone who actually knows this topic will tell you that “deviant” behaviour is actually 
just behaviour that people don’t discuss in public. “Normal” people engage in all sorts of 
things that might be considered “deviant” – as many previous studies have shown. It’s 
only “deviant” if it’s something you yourself don’t do. 
P**** answer: I’m really f***ing tired of the assumption that everyone in SL is there for 
fetish sex (Forum correspondence, March 4, 2009). 
 
More importantly, activities in sub-communities and groups are closely monitored by their owners and 
restricted to their membership. Although, as mentioned previously, these owners do not have the 
technological power to punish rule breakers – rule breakers can be banished by the owners and ostracised 
                                                      
25 A Furry is a fox-like anthropomorphic animal character. By Rymaszewski et al. (2007), the Furry is the most well represented 
group of residents in Second Life. 
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by the rest of the group as outsiders since these communities are built on, and maintained by, close 
personal bonds among their members.  
 
Actually, even Linden Lab’s three forms of punishment – warning, suspension and cancellation of account 
– depend on social and personal bonds. If a resident spends a significant amount of time and energy in 
creating his avatar and building relationships with other residents then he has much to lose if his account 
is cancelled. On the other hand, if the resident considers his participation in Second Life as trivial, then he 
may not be too concerned about cancellation. Moreover, Second Life uses an email-address based 
registration system – this resident can simply join Second Life again using a different email account. Of 
course, the resident’s computer Internet Protocol (IP) address could be traced and his computer blocked, 
but this can be easily subverted by using a different computer. It is generally well known that IP addresses 
are randomly generated by Internet Service Providers (ISP) and change periodically. Contacting the ISP of 
the resident and asking the ISP to cease providing Internet service may be subverted by switching to a 
different service provider.  
 
In short, the infrequent manifestation of deviance in Second Life is intimately associated with an 
individual’s bond with the cybercommunity and with other individuals in the cybercommunity as a whole, 
sub-communities or groups. It is precisely because of this bond that individuals in Second Life choose to 
conform to the norms and rules.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the real world, the rapid growth in surveillance technologies seems to be sending two messages – 
firstly, surveillance technologies are good for society and, secondly, the shortcomings of surveillance 
technologies can be resolved by more or better surveillance technologies in policing and related functions.  
 
Pursuing this belief and its consequences, we have considered extreme cases of communities where 
surveillance approaches “perfection”. In particular, we have analysed the cybercommunity Second Life – 
a social realm that is totally represented and captured by technology, where code can be law (Lessig 
1999). Second Life is a place where there is an abundance of surveillance technologies that can be used to 
collect and store a vast amount of information and where moral judgment can be reduced to a technical 
issue and even automated. In such a place, it is natural to assume that surveillance technologies are heavily 
used to control and regulate deviance and are effective in controlling and regulating deviance.  
 
However, we have argued that although Second Life is totally constructed by technology, the software 
technologies are not prominent and are, in fact, downplayed as mechanisms or processes to deal with 
deviance. It is clear that the authority (Linden Lab) responsible for Second Life does not want to use 
technologies of surveillance, report and punishment that are not sociologically native to Second Life to 
govern the cybercommunity. After all, the creator of the Second Life software, Philip Rosedale, intended 
to design a virtual world comparable with and transcendent of the real world, as well as a place with 
minimum rules (Guest 2007). For Rosedale, in the long term, Second Life would have to develop its own 
standards of behaviour and the thousands of sub-communities and groups would develop their local 
authorities to deal with various forms of deviance (Holahan 2006). Our evidence suggests that this has 
happened. We have shown that in Second Life, instead of surveillance technologies, it is the power of 
relationship that brings individuals together to conform to the rules and norms – forming the fabric of 
social control and the regulation of deviance. Even the effectiveness of Linden Lab’s three technological 
forms of punishment depends on social and personal bonds.  
 
Our findings are in line with the more general discovery that as behaviour on the Internet is becoming 
increasingly socially complex, techno-centered and techno-mediated methods of policing are gradually 
moving away from being the main and most effective category of method in controlling and regulating 
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criminal/deviant behaviour online (Wall and Williams 2007; Williams 2007). In their place, methods in 
the category of societal policing (Gill 1994) are becoming more prominent. In the more specific 
environment of cybercommunities, as these communities become more connected to their participants’ 
physical and emotional life, proximal (online) nodes of governance, such as reputation management 
systems, vigilante groups that employ ‘online shaming’ and virtual ‘police’ services, are developing 
rapidly and are proving to be effective (Williams 2007).  
 
In short, our research has shown that cybercommunities have a rich sociology that can help to examine 
ideas and assumptions about individuals and social groups, communities and societies. From the 
viewpoint of our research on cybercommunities, a major motif in policing in the real world – surveillance 
through technologies – becomes questionable, both in the nature of the social ideas and assumptions 
underpinning it and in the scope of its applications and effects. 
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